The Sino-Soviet border conflict was a seven-month undeclared military conflict between the Soviet Union and China in 1969, exacerbating the Sino-Soviet split during China’s Cultural Revolution. This book focuses on the Chinese perspective (another book in Casemate Publishers/Helion Company Asia @War series No.21 - The Sino-Soviet Border War of 1969, Volume 1 - First Clash at Damansky Island, and No. 23 - The Sino-Soviet Border War of 1969, Volume 2 – Confrontation at Lake Zhalanashkol) focuses on the Soviet perspective). The Battle of Damansky (Soviet name)/ Zhenbao (Chinese name) Island in the Ussuri (Wusuli) River in Manchuria, was a series of battles between the two largest Communist powers. While there were other skirmishes, the two battles outlined in this book are tied together well, with the Battle of Zhenbao (Damansky) Island (March–May 1969) being the most important and decisive, and the Tielieketi (Lake Zhalanashkol) Incident (13 August 1969).

I admit up front that I am largely ignorant on this history between two of the largest powers in the world. While it took place before I was born, it is not an excuse not to know something about this vitally strategic conflict. Like most Americans, communism was seen as a black and white conflict with capitalism and freedom, and not as a sliding scale of communism to achieve different objectives. This powerful book, well written and extremely detailed by co-authors, Benjamin Lai and Zhang Yiming really helps fill in this gap in knowledge and understanding the larger world view.

According to the Casemate website,

Benjamin Lai was originally from Hong Kong, but educated in the UK. He was one of the few Chinese to serve in the British Army as a commissioned officer in the 1980s in both Hong Kong and the UK. Fully bilingual, Benjamin Lai has been interested in World War II and postwar matters for many years but in recent times has developed specialization in Asian military issues with an emphasis on China. Among his previous works are The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Since 1949: Ground Forces, and Hong Kong 1941–1945.

Zhang Yiming is currently working in a bank. He has written one book and many articles about military history published in China. He has focused on military history, covering topics as diverse as the Sino-Soviet Border Battles, Sino-Vietnam Border Battles and Sino-India Border Battles. This is his first volume for Helion.

Both authors go into great detail, particularly on the Chinese side, and use the King’s Language which makes it more interesting to American readers (using words such as blokes, lads, “oi” and boffins – I had to look that up, which is a scientist or technician, especially one engaged in military research), as the English used doesn’t jive in my mind when reading about Chinese and Soviet militaries.

Why did Chinese Chairman Mao decide to pick a fight against a neighboring opponent ten times its size, with much better, modern weapons and supporting arms? The border between these two countries was immense and disagreements dated back over 300 years to the Qing Dynasty and the Russian Empire, then the Nationalists and Tzarists, to the Chinese and Soviet Communists. As the borders were defined by treaty before survey techniques, local landmarks were used, and interpreted differently by both sides. For example, the thalweg (middle of a channel/waterway) left the ownership of the islands in question. Chairman Mao was a deeply strategic and knew China could not take on the Soviet Union one-on-one, and to rely on a strategic deception and nuclear weapons.

“To most Americans, the logic of the birds of a feather flock together meant democracies of the world would stand together, which mirrored in the relationship between communist states. In order for the Americans to see that the Chinese Communists were not the same as the Soviet Communists – in fact, the Soviets and the Chinese were never friends – was a way to tell the world that the Chinese and the Soviets hated each other. What better way to demonstrate the animosity between China and the USSR than to use the pretext of a souring Sino-Soviet relationship to create an armed clash, a mini-war. A mini-war was a perfect means to kill two birds with one stone, rally the nation against the Russians, and let the Americans realize that China was looking for new ‘friends.’”

This book is a revealing and detailed insight into the Sino-Soviet conflict during 1969, with particular emphasis on two battles. The book is complete with extensive photographs, maps, notes, and a few detailed illustrations composing the following nine chapters:

• Introduction
• The Gathering Storm
• Memories from Chinese Veterans
• The Battle Begins
• Licking the Wounds
• Round Two, 15-17 March 1969
• Battle for the T-62
• Battle of Tielieketi, 13 August 1969
• Epilogue
• Appendices
• List of Chinese dead buried at Zhenbao Island War Cemetery
• Awards to individuals and units made by Shenyang Military Region to all those involved in the Battle of Zhenbao Island
• List of Chinese who died at the Battle of Tielieketi, 13 August 1969

The book is extremely detailed and for a lot of it, my thought was, “so what?” The authors go into excruciating detail on individual soldiers and leaders with scant attention to the Soviet side (I had to remember that this is a book on the Chinese perspective). From a military professional perspective, the battles seemed little more than small unit skirmishes, particularly the Battle for the T-62, that spanned months as the Chinese attempted to recover this brand-new technology, and the Soviets tried to stop them). Then remember that the Soviets were technologically advanced and experts at combined arms and mechanized warfare, while the Chinese were largely reliant on Type 56 semi-automatic and automatic weapons (Chinese copies of Soviet SKS and AK-47) and were leg infantry. The beauty of the authors’ writing is that the reader is drawn into the larger strategic vision that fills in a lot of gaps. The Epilogue is worth reading by itself as the 50 years following the 1969 Sino-Soviet Border War were decisive to the world at large.

Again, from the website,

This is an important episode of the Cold War that deserves greater exposure. This brief war marks a turning point between the two Communist giants and in one way or another, lay the foundation for international politics for the next 50 years. In 1972, China moved towards the US/Western camp by signing the Three Joint Communiqués, normalizing relations between the US and China and establishing a full diplomatic relationship in 1979.

Modelers will not find a lot of useful photographs, nor the usual color profiles prolific in this series, as this was largely a conflict fought with small arms, indirect fire weapons and the first combat use of Soviet BM-21s (122mm multiple rocket launcher system). There are color profiles of three Chinese combatants, including a Navy diver, a D-44 antitank gun, Type 56 recoilless gun (copy of the US M20 75mm weapon), Type 59 AT mine, F-3 anti-tank grenade (Chinese copy of the Soviet RKG-3, to which I can personally attest to its effectiveness), and POMZ-2 anti-personnel mine). The maps are helpful, and there are lots of black and white photos from official propaganda photographers. This book serves more as a detailed background to a largely unknown piece of the Cold War puzzle that fills in a lot of blanks in historical knowledge. For that reason alone, I recommend this book.

I found the book to be greatly educational and filled in a lot of gaps in my personal knowledge of the Cold War (and as a combat engineer, I was impressed with the use of white pillowcases to camouflage mines in the windy and sub-freezing -30oC weather). China was growing into a world power and its actions had great impacts on both American and Soviet/Russian policy. I have much more respect for how China played its strengths and weaknesses in this conflict. World opinion did change, and President Nixon and his administration saw an opening that led to the normalization of relations and led to the downfall of the Soviet Union. Ironically, current political actions today are at risk of turning hostile. Policy makers on both sides, particularly American, would pay heed to read this book to avoid mistakes of the past.

Profuse thanks to Casemate and IPMS/USA for providing the review sample.