Well, it’s another of those books about a little known battle of World War II, but as I read this book, I became convinced that it was important for several reasons.

Demyansk is a small town in Russia which sits about halfway between Moscow and Leningrad. This position makes the battle important. The Wehrmacht had punched through the Soviet armies in the western Soviet Union, and made fast advances toward both Leningrad and Moscow. Because the terrain west of Demyansk is mostly swamps and marshes, the advance in the areas between Moscow and Leningrad were slower. Also, there weren’t as many troops provided for this less important push. The OKW was certain they’d have both of the major cities shortly, so why bother with the farmland and villages between?

The answer to that is that is that Demyansk sits about 40 miles west of the highway now called E105/M10, the main road connection between Leningrad and Moscow. Even today, you have to go about 100 miles out of your way, on lesser roads, to avoid the section near Demyansk. The Germans really needed to take this road. And they couldn’t. When the German generals asked to pull back to a more defensible spot, Hitler forbade this, possibly the first of his “no retreat” orders.

Because of the needs of other fronts, the troops sent to the Staraya Russa/Demyansk/Rzhev Front were experienced in that they were combat units which had been depleted by fighting elsewhere. They were sent here because the Soviets weren’t sending their best here either, having other projects in progress, like Moscow, Leningrad and later, Stalingrad.

An example of this underequipping was that the Germans had PzKw IIIs and StuGsIIIs, but only the ones with the short barrel 50 mm guns. These were inadequate against the T-34s and KV-1s. The good news is that the Russians only sent a handful of T-34s and KVs to the area. Most of the anti-tank warfare by the Wehrmacht was anti-tank mines and Teller mines, which were thrown or attached by infantry.

In late 1941, STAVKA looked at the results of recent actions at Kalinin and Tikhvin and were convinced that the Germans were close to collapse. If an offensive was mounted in the Demyansk area, the forces there would collapse, allowing the Russians to cut the Leningrad front off and threatening the German supply lines to Moscow. This offensive kicked off in January, 1942, figuring the Germans couldn’t handle the winter. Unfortunately for the Russians, they had a few problems too. They didn’t give the offensive enough materiel, and no tanks to force a successful breakthrough. And the green troops they sent didn’t do any better in the weather than the Germans did. What resulted was that the two Soviet forces sent to help surrounded Demyansk, and it was rather like a dress rehearsal for Stalingrad, which started in August of 1942. This also made the Demyansk battle important, as the lessons learned here were applied at Stalingrad by the Germans.

But there were big differences between Demyansk and Stalingrad. For one thing, there weren’t as many Germans to supply, and the airlift worked, bringing in sufficient food and ammunition, as well as replacement troops. What didn’t work was that there wasn’t enough transport to get all of those supplies to the troops.

Another huge difference is that the Wehrmacht managed to reopen a land corridor to Demyansk in April of 1942, so the pocket became a salient, which the Soviets eventually forced the Germans out of.

EVALUATION

Recommended. Mr. Forczyk has put together a comprehensive account of a complex process, from the German initial assault to the partisans, the encirclement, and the final collapse of the pocket. The organization of the book makes it possible to follow what happened and why, important requirements for a book which examines a large undertaking over a long time period. Also, the maps are great helps in understanding the course of the battles.

Thanks to Osprey Publishing for the review copy, IPMS/USA for sending it to me, and to Dick Montgomery, who sent me this book even though I didn’t ask for it.